Our paper has been published in PRE

Our latest paper “Link persistence and conditional distances in multiplex networks” has been published in Physical Review E. Check out the final version at https://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.99.012322.

Goodbye ETH, hello DogBuddy

After two amazing years as a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at ETH Zürich, it was time for me to say goodbye to the world of academia and find a new challenge. But I also wanted to continue the things I am passionate about: understanding complex problems with insights from data and modeling. In my new role at DogBuddy, I can do this in the most thrilling environment that I could imagine: a dynamic start up in Barcelona. My new focus are networks between dog owners and sitters. Will they prove to be scale-free? Probably not. But very interesting, for sure. I am very excited about this new opportunity and will post some updates here from time to time.

To all my former colleagues and collaborators: I would love to stay in touch with you. Check in from time to time, and especially when you pass through Barcelona (my ETH E-Mail will expire after some time, you can find a persistent one here).


NetSci Society Young Initiative for Best Talk Pitch

I have been awarded the 3rd place at the NetSci Society Young Initiative for Best Talk Pitch for my video promoting our paper “Geometric correlations mitigate the extreme vulnerability of multiplex networks against targeted attacks” (Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 218301). You can watch the video below, and I would be happy to see you at my talk in Paris on Wed 13.6. at 2:45pm in A2 (http://iuni.iu.edu/netsci2018/cam/#/event/2447).


New paper in New Journal of Physics

My work with Dirk Helbing entitled “Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks” has now been published in New Journal of Physics. You can read the paper at http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/aac155

Abstract: Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoners dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics. Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in the harmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner’s dilemma. Here, we show that this is not always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In particular, we investigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an aggregate payoff. We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the different layers of the multiplex. We find that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and degree correlations are strong, the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and the final outcome, cooperation or defection, becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the system is then determined by the initial conditions.